Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions

We study an infinitely-repeated ?rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid- ders receive independent private signals about the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es- sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players?payo¤s tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re?nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not affect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of collusion without conspiracy.repeated game with incomplete information; private information; ratchet effect; first-price auction; dynamic auctions

When Curiosity Kills the Profits: an Experimental Examination

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our experimental auction, we find that individuals without information on each other's valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge. Then, given a choice between the two sets of rules, half the individuals still preferred to have the public information. We discuss possible explanations, including ambiguity aversion.First-price auctions, experiments, value of information, common knowledge, ambiguity aversion, Bertrand, public information

Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription

We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity version. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally, and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally.laboratory experimental methods, experimental economics, laboratory selection effects

Costly Offers and the Equilibration Properties of the Multiple Unit Double Auction Under Conditions of Unpredictable Shifts of Demand and Supply

The paper reports on the behavior of markets in which a transactions cost is imposed in the form of a tax on bids and asks that are tendered in the market. That is, in the markets studied communication with the other side of the market was costly. The markets were nonstationary in the sense that market demand and market supply shifted unpredictably each period and the markets were organized by the computerized Multiple Unit Double Auction. The results are as follow. (1) A market equilibration process is observed across the periods of nonstationary markets. (2) The imposition of the cost on offers did not negate the tendency toward market equilibration but the price discovery process was "incomplete" relative to the free offer case. (3) Price equilibration with the offer cost was slower and efficiencies were reduced

Financial Education and Access to Savings Accounts:Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from Ugandan Youth Clubs

Evidence on the effectiveness of financial education and formal savings account access is lacking, particularly for youth. We randomly assign 250 youth clubs to receive either financial education, access to a cheap group account, or both. The financial education treatments increase financial literacy; the account-only treatment does not. Administrative data shows the education plus account treatment increases bank savings relative to account-only. But survey-measured total savings shows roughly equal increases across all treatment arms. Earned income also increases in all treatment arms. We find little evidence that education and account access are strong complements, and some evidence they are substitutes

Comparing the impact on COVID-19 mortality of self-imposed behavior change and of government regulations across 13 countries.

OBJECTIVE: Countries have adopted different approaches, at different times, to reduce the transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Cross-country comparison could indicate the relative efficacy of these approaches. We assess various nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), comparing the effects of voluntary behavior change and of changes enforced via official regulations, by examining their impacts on subsequent death rates. DATA SOURCES: Secondary data on COVID-19 deaths from 13 European countries, over March-May 2020. STUDY DESIGN: We examine two types of NPI: the introduction of government-enforced closure policies and self-imposed alteration of individual behaviors in the period prior to regulations. Our proxy for the latter is Google mobility data, which captures voluntary behavior change when disease salience is sufficiently high. The primary outcome variable is the rate of change in COVID-19 fatalities per day, 16-20 days after interventions take place. Linear multivariate regression analysis is used to evaluate impacts. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: publicly available. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Voluntarily reduced mobility, occurring prior to government policies, decreases the percent change in deaths per day by 9.2 percentage points (pp) (95% confidence interval [CI] 4.5-14.0 pp). Government closure policies decrease the percent change in deaths per day by 14.0 pp (95% CI 10.8-17.2 pp). Disaggregating government policies, the most beneficial for reducing fatality, are intercity travel restrictions, canceling public events, requiring face masks in some situations, and closing nonessential workplaces. Other sub-components, such as closing schools and imposing stay-at-home rules, show smaller and statistically insignificant impacts. CONCLUSIONS: NPIs have substantially reduced fatalities arising from COVID-19. Importantly, the effect of voluntary behavior change is of the same order of magnitude as government-mandated regulations. These findings, including the substantial variation across dimensions of closure, have implications for the optimal targeted mix of government policies as the pandemic waxes and wanes, especially given the economic and human welfare consequences of strict regulations

Using behavioral science to promote international development

https://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanhttps://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanhttps://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanhttps://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanhttps://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanhttps://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/v3i3_web_bryanAccepted manuscrip